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The Houthi takeover in Yemen, also known as the September 21 Revolution, was a takeover by the Houthis, a group of Zaydi fighters led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi, that pushed the government of Yemen from power. This began with the resignation of Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa after Houthi insurgents stormed the Yemeni capital Sana'a on , escalated with the resignation of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and his ministers on after Houthi forces seized the presidential palace, residence, and key military installations, and culminated in the dissolution of parliament and the formation of a ruling council by Houthi militants on . The Houthi-led interim authority has not been recognised internationally, and it has faced widespread domestic opposition. The unrest began on 18 August 2014 as the Houthis took advantage of a government-implemented removal of fuel subsidies to call for mass protests. On 21 September, as the Houthis took control of Sana'a, the state army did not formally intervene as the moral guidance division of the armed forces declared its "support for the people's revolution". The troops that did fight the Houthis in an unsuccessful attempt to stop their advance were affiliated with General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the conservative Sunni Al-Islah Party. After gaining control over key government buildings in Sana’a, the Houthis and government signed a UN-brokered deal on 21 September to form a "unity government". The unrest took a dramatic turn in January 2015, when Houthi fighters seized control of the presidential palace and Hadi's residence in an effort to gain more influence over the government and the drafting of a new constitution. On 22 January, Hadi and his government resigned ''en masse'' rather than comply with the Houthis' demands. Three weeks later, the Houthis declared parliament to be dissolved and installed a Revolutionary Committee as the interim authority, although they agreed to keep the House of Representatives in place two weeks later as part of a power-sharing agreement.〔 ==Background== On July 30, 2014, the Yemeni government announced an increase in fuel prices as part of reforms to subsidy programs, which aimed at unlocking foreign funding and easing pressure on the budget. The lifting of subsidies came after pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which conditioned its continued financial assistance on these reforms. The government raised the price of regular gasoline to 200 Yemeni riyals per liter (93 US cents) from 125 riyals (58 US cents). Diesel used for public transport and trucks rose to 195 riyals per liter (91 US cents) from 100 riyals (46 US cents). Yemen has among the highest level of energy subsidies in the region. Given its low per capita income and staggering fiscal deficit, the country cannot afford to subsidize energy especially since the elite benefit the most from subsidized prices, not the poor. Fuel subsidies were benefiting powerful political allies of Ali Abdullah Saleh who were smuggling subsidized oil to neighboring markets where they would reap huge profits. In 2013, fuel subsidies cost the Yemeni government $3 billion, roughly 20 percent of state expenditure, according to a Finance Ministry statement carried by Yemen's official news agency.〔 All the same, fuel subsidies are among the few widely available social goods in Yemen, they keep down the cost of transport, water, and food, while supporting local industry. The cash-strapped Yemeni government had been negotiating with the International Monetary Fund for more than a year to secure a loan as a way to access much needed financing. The loan program would require the removal of subsidies, but the IMF recommended gradual price adjustments and an information and communication campaign to prepare the public. Neither of these were done.〔 The IMF and other international donors also emphasize the need to expand the social safety net and cash transfer payments to those who would be most affected by the price increases. The United States and other donors had even increased their contributions to the Social Welfare Fund in the summer of 2014 in anticipation of subsidy removal. The Yemeni government ignored the advice.〔 The transitional government that was established with Gulf Cooperation Council brokerage in November 2011, which gave president Saleh immunity from prosecution, was split equally between Saleh’s General People's Congress Party and al-Islah, Yemen's main Islamist party that was a key presence in the regime protesters tried to overthrow in 2011. Instead of reshaping the political order to bring in new political voices, address corruption, and introduce responsive and accountable governance, partisan interests have largely paralyzed the transitional government led by Mohammed Basindawa, perpetuating the elite dominated politics of Sana'a and its tribal allies. The Yemeni government lacked any coordinated economic planning, with key ministers hailing from competing political parties lack any incentive to work toward a unifying vision for the country.〔 The decision to lift fuel subsidies granted the Houthi movement, with its own axe to grind, the populist mandate they needed to ride into Sana'a and seize power. They managed to capitalize on palpable frustration among diverse segments of the population and fears of an al-Islah dominated government.〔 However, their led interim authority has faced widespread domestic opposition as well. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Houthi takeover in Yemen」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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